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       Thomas F. Dorn, Jr., Esq. 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
A request by a petitioner under 28 U.S.C. S 2255 for an 
evidentiary hearing under the District Court's discr etionary 
power is not unusual and not often granted. However , in 
this appeal, the petitioner presents a rar e situation where 
he claims the right to a mandatory evidentiary hearing. 
 
In September 1996, a federal grand jury in the District of 
New Jersey indicted Julio Solis on a one-count indictment 
charging him and four co-conspirators with conspiring to 
distribute more than 5 kilograms of cocaine in violation of 
21 U.S.C. S 841(a) and 21 U.S.C. S 946. The defendant 
entered into a plea agreement. The defendant claims that 
after sentencing, he requested his counsel to appeal but his 
attorney failed to take any action. Eight months after 
sentencing, the defendant filed a pro se motion to vacate 
his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2255. The District 
Court, certifying that there was no probable cause for an 
appeal, denied the motion without a hearing. Solisfiled a 
pro se notice of appeal. We vacate the sentence and remand 
for a hearing as required by 28 U.S.C.S 2255. 
 
I. 
 
In August of 1996, a man known as "Yayo" hired Julio 
Solis ("Solis") to transport 16 kilograms of cocaine from 
Houston, Texas to Rhode Island, where Solis lived at the 
time. At Yayo's direction, Solis contacted Allen White 
("White"), the owner of the Carthage T rucking Company in 
Houston, and directed White to receive the cocaine at a 
warehouse in Houston.1 White then hired his friend Ronald 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Solis had previously worked for White at Carthage Trucking. 
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Sutton, a truck driver, to transport the cocaine from 
Houston to Newark, New Jersey. 
 
White instructed Sutton to rent a car and drive it to 
Carthage Trucking. Sutton complied, and White loaded the 
cocaine into the rental car. White told Sutton to drive the 
car to Newark and contact "Julio" when he arrived there. 
He also instructed Sutton to collect $11,300 fr om the 
persons who received the cocaine, to keep a portion for 
himself as payment, to pay some to Julio to r epay an 
outstanding debt, and to wire the balance to White in 
Houston. 
 
Sutton left Houston for Newark in a rental car carrying 
the cocaine. On August 29, 1996, he was pulled over by the 
Louisiana State Police for driving erratically. They searched 
the car and found 16 kilograms of cocaine in the spare tire 
compartment of the trunk. They summoned the Drug 
Enforcement Administration ("DEA"). Sutton agreed to 
cooperate with the DEA, who arranged to airlift Sutton and 
the rental car to Newark for a controlled delivery of the 
drugs. 
 
On the way to Newark airport, Sutton placed a monitored 
telephone call to White informing him of his pending arrival 
in New Jersey as planned. Apparently, White r elayed this 
information to Solis, who arranged for two other men from 
Rhode Island, John Arboleda and Juan Velez, to meet 
Sutton in New Jersey. The DEA agents, after monitoring 
Sutton's transfer of the drugs to Arboleda and V elez, 
arrested Arboleda and Velez. While under arrest, Arboleda 
and Velez received signals on an electr onic pager indicating 
a telephone number later identified as Solis's. In July, 
1997, Solis was arrested. 
 
In September, 1997, Solis entered into a counseled guilty 
plea agreement with the Government. The agreement 
provided that under 21 U.S.C. S 841(b), Solis's crime 
carried a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years 
imprisonment and a maximum sentence of life 
imprisonment. It also stated that the Government made no 
representations regarding the sentence Solis would 
ultimately receive. In the plea agreement, the Government 
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made the following conditional promise r egarding a so- 
called "Safety Valve" provision: 2 
 
       If at the time of sentencing the United States is 
       satisfied that the five enumerated characteristics set 
       forth in 18 U.S.S.G. S 3553(f)(1)-(5) apply to Julio Solis 
       and his commission of the charged offense, the United 
       States will make such a representation to the 
       sentencing court and will recommend that the 
       sentencing court impose a sentence pursuant to the 
       applicable Sentencing Guidelines without regar d to any 
       statutory minimum sentence. 
 
No stipulation was made regarding Solis's criminal 
history score, and the Government r eserved the right to 
argue the effect of any non-stipulated facts to the 
sentencing court. The prosecution also r eserved the right to 
correct any stipulation if it conflicted with any credible 
evidence subsequently obtained. Finally, the Gover nment 
represented that it would inform the sentencing court of 
any information it had, favorable or unfavorable, that was 
relevant to sentencing. 
 
At his plea colloquy Solis assured the Court that no one 
had made him any assurances or promises r egarding the 
sentence the court would ultimately impose and that he 
was satisfied with his attorney's services. The prosecutor 
reiterated the conditional nature of the Safety Valve 
representation, stating that the Safety V alve would apply 
only to Solis if, at the time of sentencing, allfive factors 
enumerated in S 3553(f) were met. Solis assured the court 
that the Government had accurately described the plea 
agreement. The court accepted Solis's plea. 
 
During its investigation of Solis's background the 
Probation Office discovered that, in 1995, he had been 
convicted of petty theft in a state court in Houston, Texas. 
The state court sentenced him to a $200 fine and 180 days 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The "Safety Valve" in 18 U.S.C.S 3553(f) provides that statutory 
minimum sentences do not apply to defendants who meet five 
enumerated requirements. Relevant her e is the requirement that "the 
defendant does not have more than 1 criminal history point, as 
determined under the sentencing guidelines . .. ." 18 U.S.C. S 3553(f)(1). 
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probation. See PSR P 48-49. That conviction accounted for 
one criminal history point. Solis paid part of thefine but 
not in full. Texas issued a probation violation warrant 
against him, which warrant was still active when the PSR 
was written. See PSR P 50. Ther efore, Solis committed the 
instant offense while a probation violation warrant was 
outstanding against him. Accordingly, the District Court 
added two additional criminal history points pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. S 4A1.1(d), Application Note 4, giving Solis a total 
criminal history score of three. See  PSR P 50-51. This score 
rendered Solis ineligible for the Safety V alve. See 18 U.S.C. 
S 3553(f)(1). Accordingly, the District Court imposed the 
statutory minimum sentence of ten years imprisonment. 
 
On his motion to vacate his sentence, Solis alleged that 
he was entitled to relief because 1) his lawyer was 
ineffective for, inter alia, failing to file a direct appeal as 
requested; 2) the District Court misapplied the Sentencing 
Guidelines; and 3) the Government breached the plea 
agreement. 
 
By order dated December 22, 1999 a panel of this Court 
construed the notice of appeal as a request for a certificate 
of appealability and referred the question of whether such 
a certificate should issue to this merits panel. See Appx. 
16. The panel appointed counsel to repr esent Solis and 
directed the parties to brief the following issues, in addition 
to any other issues Solis wished to raise: 1) whether trial 
counsel's failure to file a requested appeal constitutes per 
se ineffective assistance of counsel; 2) whether 28 U.S.C. 
S 2255 makes an evidentiary hearing mandatory when a 
prisoner alleges that he asked trial counsel tofile a direct 
appeal and counsel failed to do so; and 3) whether aS 2255 
petitioner who alleges that trial counsel was inef fective for 
failing to file a direct appeal is required to state the grounds 
on which he would have appealed if counsel had filed the 
requested appeal. 
 
II. 
 
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. S 2255. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. S 2253 to decide whether to issue a certificate of 
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appealability and, if such a certificate is issued, under 
S 2253 and S 2255 to resolve the appeal. We review for 
abuse of discretion the dismissal of a petition brought 
under 28 U.S.C. S 2255. See United States v. Friedland, 83 
F.3d 1531, 1538 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
A certificate of appealability may be granted"only if the 
applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of 
a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. S 2253(c)(2). A defendant 
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the 
Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution must showfirst 
that counsel's representation was objectively unreasonable, 
and second, that counsel's deficient perfor mance was 
prejudicial. See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 476-77 
(2000) (citing Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 
(1984)). 
 
With regard to objectively r easonable representation, 
counsel has "a constitutionally-imposed duty to consult 
with the defendant about an appeal when ther e is reason to 
think either (1) that a rational defendant would want to 
appeal (for example, because there are nonfriviolous 
grounds for appeal), or (2) that this particular defendant 
reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was interested 
in appealing." Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 480 (2000). In 
cases where the defendant pleaded guilty, "the court must 
consider such factors as whether the defendant r eceived 
the sentence bargained for as part of the plea and whether 
the plea expressly reserved or waived some or all appeal 
rights." Id. Regarding prejudice, the Supreme Court held 
that "when counsel's constitutionally deficient performance 
deprives a defendant of an appeal that he otherwise would 
have taken, the defendant has made out a successful 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim entitling him to an 
appeal." Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 484. Prejudice is 
presumed from counsel's failure tofile a notice of appeal 
when so requested by a client. See, e.g. , Kitchen v. United 
States, 227 F.3d 1014, 1020-21 (7th Cir . 2000). 
 
In this case, Solis claims that he directed his attorney to 
file an appeal, but that his attorney failed to comply. On its 
face, this creates a question of fact whether Solis directed 
his attorney to file an appeal. If he did, then Solis's Sixth 
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Amendment right to counsel was violated by his counsel's 
failure to act. See Flores-Ortega , 528 U.S. at 477. 
 
28 U.S.C. S 2255 provides that: 
 
       A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court 
       established by Act of Congress . . . may move the court 
       which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or 
       correct the sentence. Unless the motion and thefiles 
       and records of the case conclusively show that the 
       prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause 
       notice thereof to be served upon the United States 
       attorney, grant a prompt hearing  thereon, determine 
       the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of 
       law with respect thereto. . . . (emphasis added). 
 
Solis maintains that he instructed his attor ney to take an 
appeal, see Reply Br. 3, but no dir ect appeal was taken. 
Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. S 2255 requir es that Solis should 
have received an evidentiary hearing befor e the District 
Court to determine whether he requested or reasonably 
demonstrated to counsel that he desired to appeal. It is 
irrelevant whether the Government or Solis requested the 
hearing because S 2255 requires the District Court to hold 
a hearing sua sponte when, as here, the files and records 
do not show conclusively that Solis was not entitled to 
relief. 
 
The Government admits that "the District Court did not 
undertake the kind of credibility deter mination that is 
required when there is an allegation that the direct appeal 
rights have not been protected by counsel." Atty. Gross, for 
Government on Tape of Oral Argument. The Government 
argues that even if Solis had received a direct appeal, he 
would be in no better position than he is befor e us now 
because the motions panel's order allowed him to raise "any 
other issues." Indeed, in the instant appeal, Solis presents 
claims normally raised on direct appeal (challenging his 
sentence and his plea bargain), in addition to those 
normally raised in a S 2255 petition (ineffective assistance 
of counsel). Of course, the Government contends that all of 
Solis's issues are meritless, and that we should decide 
them against him even if the District Court err ed in not 
holding an evidentiary hearing. 
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We reject the Government's position. Section 2255 
requires that a hearing precede any District Court 
determination of a disputed issue of fact concerning 
petitioner's entitlement to relief. Her e, it is unclear whether 
Solis requested or was interested in pursuing an appeal; 
the District Court erred in denying Solis a hearing. Solis's 
ability to raise "any" arguments her e does not substitute for 
his right to a nunc pro tunc dir ect appeal if, after a hearing, 
the District Court concludes that Solis is entitled to a 
remedy for the violation of his rights as set forth in Flores- 
Ortega. A new opportunity to directly appeal is the remedy 
for petitioner's alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. See 
United States v. West, 240 F.3d 456, 459 (5th Cir. 2001). 
We will not presume that Solis raised every possible 
argument in his brief before us simply because he could 
have done so. Adoption of the Government's position may 
cut corners in the name of efficiency but it may be at the 
expense of important procedural rights. 
 
The District Court, denying Solis's petition without a 
hearing, explained that Solis was obligated to raise any and 
all of his direct appeal issues in his S 2255 petition. See 
Appx. 12 n.6. We believe that this is not a correct statement 
of the law if Solis actually requested his counsel to file an 
appeal. The District Court should have held a hearing to 
determine the truthfulness of this claim. The District 
Court's solution to the issue -- requiring consolidation of 
direct and collateral appeals -- is not an adequate 
substitute and is unsupported by statute and case law. 
 
If Solis is correct in his claim that he r equested his 
lawyer to appeal, counsel may have been inef fective for 
failing to file the appeal. We ther efore hold that when a 
defendant is convicted of a crime and alleges that his 
lawyer failed to appeal the conviction, and ther e is a 
potential factual dispute on this issue, the defendant is 
entitled to a hearing before the District Court to prove that 
he made the request and that the lawyer failed to honor it. 
However, a defendant would not be entitled to a hearing if 
his allegations were contradicted conclusively by the record, 
or if the allegations were patently frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. 
S 2255; United States v. Laetividal-Gonzalez, 939 F.2d 1455, 
1465 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Holmes v. United States, 876 
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F.2d 1545, 1553 (11th Cir. 1989)), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 
912 (1992), and overruled on other grounds, United States 
v. Giltner, 972 F.2d 1559, 1562 (11th Cir .1992). If on 
remand the District Court determines that Solis's counsel 
was ineffective, then Solis must be given the opportunity 
nunc pro tunc to brief his direct appeal in full. Part of that 
brief may include his claim that he would not have entered 
a plea bargain knowing that the safety valve for the 
mandatory minimum was blocked. We need not r each the 
merits of Solis's direct appeal at this junctur e, as he was 
not obligated to raise his direct appeal issues in his S 2255 
petition. See McHale v. United States, 175 F .3d 115, 119 
(2d Cir. 1999) ("petitioner need not  demonstrate that, but 
for the ineffectiveness of counsel, such an appeal would 
have succeeded or even would have had merit.") Nor must 
we determine whether Solis's counsel was inef fective for 
any other reason. Our holding is limited to the issue of 
Solis's entitlement to a direct appeal. The other ineffective 
assistance claims, if still viable, may be raised in a future 
S 2255 petition. 
 
III. 
 
Accordingly, the order denying Petitioner's motion to 
vacate or set aside his sentence will be vacated and the 
case remanded for a hearing pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2255.3 
All other issues raised in Petitioner's S 2255 petition will be 
denied without prejudice. In the event the Petitioner 
presents another S 2255 petition, it shall be deemed his 
first filed petition. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We note, as did the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in a 
similar case that resulted in a vacatur and r emand for a S 2255 hearing, 
that Flores-Ortega was decided after the District Court rendered its 
decision. See United States v. Witherspoon , 231 F.3d 923, 927 n.6 (4th 
Cir. 2000). 
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